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AN OPEN AND SHUT CASE: WHY (AND HOW) THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT SHOULD RESTRAIN THE GOVERNMENT’S FORUM 
CLOSURE POWER  
Jordan E. Pratt∗ 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that when the government 
opens a nontraditional public forum, it retains the power to shut down 
the forum subsequently. But the Court has not specifically addressed 
whether this forum closure power knows any constitutional limitations. 
Several circuits, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, have suggested in dicta that this power is unlimited—that the 
government may shut down nontraditional public forums at any time 
and for any reason. While the government certainly enjoys broad 
discretion as a property owner, it cannot wield its ownership powers in a 
manner that will infringe basic constitutional guarantees. This Note 
argues that, at a minimum, the First Amendment’s guarantees against 
retaliation and viewpoint discrimination should rein in the outer bounds 
of the government’s forum closure power, and that the Eleventh Circuit 
should qualify its expansive dicta by recognizing a cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for plaintiffs who allege that a forum was shut 
down in retaliation against their viewpoint. Such a rule would protect 
the fundamental guarantees of the First Amendment, harmonize with 
existing First Amendment retaliation doctrine, vindicate the purposes of 
§ 1983, and strike the correct balance between protecting constitutional 
rights on one hand and government discretion on the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Donald and Meagan Burrows received a flyer from their children’s 
elementary school advertising a “Tile Wall program” in which the 
school invited “kids, parents, grandparents, families, classroom groups, 
Girl Scout/Boy Scout troops—everyone” to purchase tiles for display on 
a wall on school property.1 The Pacific Elementary Parent Teacher 
Association organized the program to raise funds for itself, as well as to 
“beautify the [elementary school’s] campus.”2 The flyer stated that 
recipients could purchase tiles for fifty dollars apiece3 and that they 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Nominal Damages at 
paras. 11, 13, Burrows v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV-05-1631-NM (SHx) 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Burrows’ Complaint] (internal quotation marks omitted); 
accord Defendants’ Answer to Complaint; Demand for Jury Trial at para. 1, Burrows v. 
Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV-05-1631-NM (SHx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2005) 
[hereinafter School District’s Answer]. 
 2. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 11; accord School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 3. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 17; accord School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
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would have the opportunity to design and paint their own ceramic tiles.4 
The school, school district, and parent teacher association had no 
written policy establishing criteria for accepting or rejecting messages 
displayed on tiles,5 and the flyer expressly encouraged “[f]amily tile 
groupings.”6 The advertisement included sample pictures called “A Few 
Ideas for Inspiration,” several of which depicted sets of tiles that formed 
a larger picture when arranged in a particular order.7 
The Burrows participated in the program, and their tiles, when 
arranged in the manner they requested, formed the image of a cross.8 
After receiving a complaint from another parent about the Burrows’ 
cross,9 the principal met with the Burrows on multiple occasions and 
informed them that their tiles would have to be rearranged or removed 
because the cross was a “permanent” religious display on school 
grounds.10 The tiles were eventually rearranged without the consent of 
the Burrows, who requested, but never received, a letter from the school 
district’s attorney stating the legal justification for the tiles’ 
rearrangement.11 The Burrows, through counsel, then notified the 
principal and superintendent that they believed the school’s action 
violated their civil rights.12 Soon thereafter, the school board decided to 
terminate the Tile Wall program altogether and remove the tiles rather 
than allow the Burrows’ cross to remain on display.13 
Donald and Meagan Burrows, after asserting their First Amendment 
rights to express their message in a limited public forum14 and to 
petition the government for redress of grievances,15 were met with 
retaliatory forum closure. Given the religious content of the Burrows’ 
tiles, the improbability of an Establishment Clause violation, and the 
possibility of avoiding litigation by simply leaving the tiles alone, it 
seems likely that the school decided to end the Tile Wall program in an 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 14; accord School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 5. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 16; accord School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 6. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord School 
District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 7. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord School 
District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 8. Burrows’ Complaint at paras. 37, 39; accord School District’s Answer at paras. 1, 7. 
 9. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 42; accord School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 10. Burrows’ Complaint at paras. 48, 56 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 
School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 11. Burrows’ Complaint at paras. 50, 58, 60, 66, 67; accord School District’s Answer at 
paras. 1, 13. 
 12. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 68; accord School District’s Answer at para. 14. 
 13. Burrows’ Complaint at para. 70; accord School District’s Answer at para. 1. 
 14. A “limited public forum” is a place the government has opened for expressive activity 
to certain speakers or the discussion of certain topics. See discussion infra Section I.C. 
 15. The Supreme Court has explained that the right of access to the courts is one facet of 
the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. See Cal. 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
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effort to suppress the Burrows’ viewpoint.16 Unfortunately for the 
Burrows, in the majority of jurisdictions—including perhaps the 
Eleventh Circuit—their complaint alleging viewpoint discrimination 
and retaliatory forum closure likely would be subject to dismissal for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.17 
Although the Supreme Court has observed that, at its core, the First 
Amendment protects citizens from government-initiated viewpoint 
discrimination18 and retaliation,19 several circuits have suggested they 
will not vindicate these bedrock constitutional rights in the forum 
closure context.20 When religious and other ideological individuals or 
groups challenge their exclusion or expulsion from a designated or 
limited public forum, the government will often respond by simply 
closing the forum altogether,21 just as it did in the Burrows’ case. Under 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Although the school board might have cited Establishment Clause concerns as the 
reason for shutting down the Tile Wall program, any such purported concerns were 
unwarranted. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760, 769–70 
(1995) (holding that a private religious display permitted in a public forum constituted private 
expression and did not violate the Establishment Clause); see also Patrick M. Garry, Religious 
Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential 
Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“As history demonstrates, the 
Establishment Clause aims to keep the government from singling out certain religious sects for 
preferential treatment, but it does not prevent the government from showing favoritism to 
religion in general.” (footnote omitted)). The Burrows’ expression of their religious faith on a 
small portion of the wall would have been perceived in the context of a great variety of 
personalized expressions by other families and would not have risked the appearance of 
governmental advancement of religion. 
 17. The majority of circuits that have addressed the issue interpret the government’s 
forum closure power quite broadly and do not appear to recognize a cause of action in 
retaliatory forum closure cases. See discussion infra Parts II, III. Even though the Burrows’ case 
never reached adjudication on the merits, it bears mentioning that one federal district court, on 
facts remarkably similar to those of the Burrows’ case, stated that forum closure cannot provide 
a cause of action. See Demmon v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 342 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476–79 (E.D. 
Va. 2004). 
 18. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), 
the Court stated: 
 
Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be 
unconstitutional. . . . When the government targets not subject matter, but 
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an 
egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain 
from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion 
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. 
 
Id. at 828–29 (citations omitted). 
 19. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (“[A]s a general matter the First 
Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory 
actions . . . for speaking out.”). 
  20.  See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
 21. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1114 n.10 (S.D. Ind. 2005) 
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such circumstances, feelings of animus toward speakers’ viewpoints 
may play a central role in the government actor’s decision to close the 
forum. This type of forum closure contravenes the foundational 
guarantees of the First Amendment. Nevertheless, courts generally have 
not yet recognized a cause of action and remedy under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 198322 for retaliatory forum closure.23 In fact, several circuits, 
including the Eleventh Circuit,24 have suggested that the government’s 
forum closure power knows no limits.25 
Courts have addressed retaliatory governmental actions in other 
contexts, however, and have held that to state a § 1983 claim for First 
Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must plead that (1) he engaged in an 
activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) the government took 
significant adverse action against him; and (3) the plaintiff’s constitutionally 
protected conduct was a substantial factor in the government’s decision 
to take adverse action against the plaintiff.26 This Note argues that 
courts, and in particular the Eleventh Circuit, should temper broad 
constructions of the government’s forum closure power by invoking 
First Amendment retaliation doctrine to recognize a § 1983 cause of 
action for retaliatory forum closure.27 Such a logical extension of this 
doctrine will provide sensible limits on the government’s power to shut 
down public forums and will ensure that the First Amendment’s basic 
protections against retaliation and viewpoint discrimination do not ring 
hollow for the victims of retaliatory forum closure. In addition, this 
Note proposes a form of injunctive relief that will adequately protect a 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights without unduly burdening the government’s 
                                                                                                                     
(“Government bodies that find they have created a public forum often respond to controversies 
over access by closing the forum entirely.”). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 states, in relevant part: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
 
Id. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II. 
 24. See discussion infra Part III. 
 25. See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
 26. See cases cited infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 27. At least one commentator has observed that, although the government has an inherent 
right to control its property, “a more difficult question is whether general First Amendment 
principles prohibiting viewpoint discrimination are sufficiently hale to prohibit a governmental 
entity from closing down a public forum in direct retaliation against a particular group’s 
expressive message.” 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
§ 8:51 (3d ed. 1996). This Note answers that question in the affirmative and argues that the issue 
is not a difficult one to resolve. See discussion infra Part V. 
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legitimate exercise of control over public property. 
Part I will briefly survey the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
forum doctrine, and Part II will explore the state of the law on the scope 
of the government’s forum closure power. Part III will analyze a 
decision by the Eleventh Circuit that suggests, as other circuits have 
also implied, that the government’s forum closure power is unlimited. 
Part IV will summarize the Supreme Court’s and the circuits’ First 
Amendment retaliation jurisprudence and discuss the elements of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim. Finally, Part V will argue that the 
Eleventh Circuit in particular should clarify its position on the power of 
the government to close public forums by extending First Amendment 
retaliation doctrine to provide a cause of action in retaliatory forum 
closure cases. It will explore why retaliatory forum closure transgresses 
fundamental constitutional guarantees, how the Eleventh Circuit can use 
existing case law on First Amendment retaliation claims to recognize a 
cause of action in retaliatory forum closure cases, and what the 
appropriate remedy should be. 
I.  A BRIEF GLANCE AT FIRST AMENDMENT FORUM DOCTRINE 
In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,28 the 
Supreme Court differentiated between three categories of government 
property29 and introduced the modern framework used to analyze the 
First Amendment claims of speakers that have been denied access to 
such property.30 In Perry, a public school district denied a teachers’ 
union access to its mail system and teacher mailboxes but granted a 
right of access to a rival union. The excluded union brought suit to 
challenge the denial of access.31At issue in the case was whether the 
district’s preferential grant of access to one union and denial of access 
to the other ran afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.32 
Beginning with the observation that “[t]he existence of a right of 
access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon 
such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the 
                                                                                                                     
 28. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 29. See Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299, 303 
(2009) (“Not until 1983, in the Perry decision, did the Court attempt to impose structure and 
clarity upon [the part of First Amendment doctrine] involving access by speakers to non-
traditional governmentally controlled fora.” (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983))). 
 30. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990) (“In [Perry], the Court 
announced a tripartite framework for determining how First Amendment interests are to be 
analyzed with respect to Government property.” (citation omitted)); see also Emily Gold 
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-
Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 91 n.209 (2008) (“Perry and Cornelius [v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)] are seminal decisions that outlined the 
general legal framework for First Amendment cases involving a nonpublic forum.”). 
 31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 39–41. 
 32. Id. at 44. 
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property at issue,”33 the Court concluded that the internal mail system 
and teacher mailboxes constituted a “nonpublic forum.”34 Due to the 
mail system’s status as a nonpublic forum, the Court held that the 
school district had “the right to make distinctions in access on the basis 
of subject matter and speaker identity” so long as “they are reasonable 
in light of the purpose which the forum . . . serves.”35 In its decision, the 
Court explicitly referred to three categories of forums36 and implicitly 
recognized one subcategory37 that it developed more fully in subsequent 
decisions.38  
A.  The Traditional Public Forum 
The “traditional” or “quintessential” public forum39 consists of 
government property which “by long tradition or by government fiat 
[has] been devoted to assembly and debate.”40 The government may 
create a traditional public forum without any intention of opening an 
area for public expression, as the traditional public forum is defined not 
by the label the government gives it, but by its physical characteristics 
and objective and historical use.41 The Supreme Court has recognized 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 46, 49; see also id. at 46 (describing the nonpublic forum as “[p]ublic property 
which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication”). 
 35. Id. at 49. 
 36. These are the “quintessential” or “traditional” public forums, the “designated public 
forum,” and the “nonpublic forum.” See id. at 45 (describing the “quintessential public 
forum[]”); id. at 46 (referencing the “traditional public forum,” a term presumably synonymous 
with “quintessential public forum”); id. at 46 (referencing “[p]ublic property” that is designated 
as “a forum for public communication”); id. at 49 (referencing the “nonpublic forum”). 
 37. This is the “limited public forum,” which consists of a designated public forum held 
open only to certain speakers or to the discussion of certain topics. See id. at 46 n.7 (“A public 
forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups or for the discussion 
of certain subjects.” (citations omitted)); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (bifurcating Perry’s designated public forum into those of 
“limited” and “unlimited” character). Much confusion has arisen regarding the limited public 
forum. See generally Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2142 
(2009) (describing the lack of clarity in the Court’s designated public forum and limited public 
forum jurisprudence). However, this Note does not attempt to address the ambiguities of modern 
forum doctrine and seeks merely to describe the four types of forums that the Supreme Court 
has recognized in its decisions. 
 38. The Supreme Court has continued to analyze claims under the forum analysis it 
developed in Perry, using the labels “traditional public forum,” “designated public forum,” 
“limited public forum,” and “nonpublic forum.” See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (describing “traditional public forums,” “designated public 
forums,” and “limited public forums”); Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 
(2007) (referencing the “nonpublic forum”). 
 39. The Perry Court uses these terms interchangeably. See 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
 40. Id. at 45. 
 41. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) 
(“[T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent. 
The objective characteristics of these properties require the government to accommodate private 
7
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public parks, streets, and sidewalks as falling within this category.42 
These public lands bear the status of traditional public forums because 
they “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”43 
Due to the traditional public forum’s historically pivotal role in 
accommodating public assembly, speech, and debate, governmental 
restrictions on speech in traditional public forums receive high levels of 
judicial scrutiny.44 In a traditional public forum, a government actor 
may not exclude speakers based on the content of their speech unless 
such content-based exclusion “is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”45 The 
government may, however, enforce content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restrictions on speech in traditional public forums as long as 
those restrictions meet an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.46 
B.  The Designated Public Forum 
The Perry Court also set forth a second type of forum, which 
“consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activity.”47 This forum differs from the 
traditional public forum in that its status arises not from tradition or 
governmental fiat, but from designation.48 After Perry, this forum has 
been referred to as the “designated public forum.”49 The creation of a 
designated public forum requires a deliberate act on behalf of the 
government to open public property for expressive activity.50  
                                                                                                                     
speakers.”); Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1051 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 
traditional public forum is defined by its objective characteristics, not by governmental intent or 
action.”), rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2010). 
 42. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 777 (1988) (White, 
J., dissenting). 
 43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) 
(stating that “regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available 
for public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny”). 
 45. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 46. In other words, restrictions are permissible as long as they are “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.” Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 46 (describing the nonpublic forum as “[p]ublic property which is not by 
tradition or designation a forum for public communication” (emphasis added)). 
 49. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678 (“The second 
category of public property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited 
character—property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the 
public.”). 
 50. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) 
8
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The Constitution does not require the government to provide 
designated public forums, but when the government does provide them, 
it must operate them according to the same constitutional standards that 
govern traditional public forums.51 In designated public forums, 
“[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a 
content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a 
compelling state interest.”52 When acting to exclude a person or group 
from a designated public forum, government actors cannot discriminate 
on the basis of viewpoint without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.53 
Instances of the designated public forum abound. Courts have found 
that state university meeting facilities made available for student use, 
school board meetings open to the public, advertising space in state-
owned subway stations, city-owned-and-operated senior centers, and 
public libraries all constitute designated public forums.54 
C.  The Limited Public Forum 
In Perry’s discussion of the designated public forum, it differentiated 
between those nontraditional public forums held open to the public 
generally and those held open only to certain speakers or the discussion 
of certain topics.55 Decisions after Perry have labeled this latter 
subcategory the “limited public forum.”56 
                                                                                                                     
(“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, 
but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the 
Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to 
designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 51. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 
2984 n.11 (2010) (stating that “governmental entities create designated public forums when 
‘government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally 
opened up for that purpose’; speech restrictions in such a forum ‘are subject to the same strict 
scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
129 S. Ct. 1125, 1127 (2009))). 
 52. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 53. See Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A 
designated public forum, on the other hand, is an area dedicated by the government for a certain 
class of speakers. Exclusion of a speaker who is within the certain class must pass strict 
scrutiny; exclusion of a speaker outside the class must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 54. See Hawkins v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing 
several examples of designated public forums). For a discussion on a recently emerging 
designated public forum question, see Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The 
First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (discussing 
whether wireless networks in public locations constitute designated public forums). 
 55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (“A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such 
as use by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” (citation omitted)). 
 56. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11 (“[G]overnmental entities 
establish limited public forums by opening property ‘limited to use by certain groups or 
dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. 
9
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In determining those topics and groups to which a limited public 
forum is held open, the government may employ content-based 
restrictions so long as they are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.57 
Thus, in defining the parameters of a limited public forum, the 
government may discriminate among certain topics but may not 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.58 Furthermore, if a speaker falls 
within the parameters that define a limited public forum, commentators 
have said that he enjoys a “right of access” to the forum such that his 
exclusion will trigger heightened scrutiny.59 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has held that although the government has broad leeway in setting up 
the parameters that define a limited public forum, it does not enjoy such 
discretion in applying those parameters to exclude speakers who fall 
within the class of individuals to whom the forum has been held open.60 
Examples of limited public forums include a municipal auditorium 
dedicated to certain types of expressive activities61 and school facilities 
                                                                                                                     
at 1127)); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (referencing the 
“limited public forum”). 
 57. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (“[T]he Court has permitted restrictions on 
access to a limited public forum . . . with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable 
and viewpoint neutral[.]”); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (“The State’s power to restrict 
speech [in a limited public forum], however, is not without limits. The restriction must not 
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be ‘reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985))). 
 58. See Waldman, supra note 30, at 98 n.251 (observing that in Good News Club, “[t]he 
Court . . . held that viewpoint discrimination was impermissible in a limited public forum” 
(citing Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111–12)). 
 59. See, e.g., Rohr, supra note 29, at 307–09 (2009). Professor Marc Rohr derived the 
following from Perry’s dicta concerning limited public forums and citation of Widmar v. 
Vincent: 
 
In a limited public forum, we must first identify the speakers to whom the 
forum has been opened—the favored class of speakers, if you will—and 
then ask whether the speaker who seeks access to the forum—the 
challenger—is an “entit[y] of similar character” to those to whom the forum 
has been opened. In other words, we must ask whether the challenger falls 
within the favored class of speakers. If the answer is “yes,” then that 
challenger enjoys a “right of access” to the forum. To put it another way, a 
limited public forum would be “open” to speakers who fall into the same 
class as those to whom the forum has already been opened.  
 
Id. at 307 (footnote omitted) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 48). 
 60. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it 
has itself set.”); see also Ark. Educ. Television Co. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (“If the 
government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated public forum is 
made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
 61. United States v. Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485, 1488 n.5 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 802–05). 
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opened for the use of student groups.62 
D.  The Nonpublic Forum 
Having identified two categories and one subcategory of forums, the 
Perry Court went on to identify the “nonpublic forum” as “[p]ublic 
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public 
communication.”63 Invoking the principle that “the State, no less than a 
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,”64 Perry made clear 
that the government enjoys great latitude as a property owner when 
restricting speech in the nonpublic forum.65 Time, place, and manner 
restrictions, as well as the exclusion of individual speakers, will be 
upheld so long as they are reasonable and do not operate on the basis of 
viewpoint discrimination.66 Examples of nonpublic forums include 
“airport terminals, military bases, prisons, and similar properties,”67 as 
well as public schools’ internal mail systems.68 
II.  THE STATE OF THE LAW ON THE GOVERNMENT’S FORUM CLOSURE 
POWER 
The Perry Court provided some guidance regarding the limitations 
that the First Amendment places on forum closure. The government 
may not close a traditional public forum from all expressive activity.69 
Presumably this owes to the fact that traditional public forums have 
always been used by the public for assembly, communication, and 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.12 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829) 
(explaining that university facilities opened up to student groups constituted limited public 
forums). 
 63. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129–30 (1981)). 
 65. Id. (“In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the 
[nonpublic] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the 
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”). It has been argued that the Court has used the 
nonpublic forum to define public locations where First Amendment claims are “radically 
devalued and immune from independent judicial scrutiny.” ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 234 (1995). 
 66. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also id. at 46–54 (finding a public school internal mailing 
system to be a nonpublic forum and upholding restrictions on speech and selective exclusion of 
plaintiffs via a deferential reasonableness inquiry); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (noting that 
“[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity 
so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and 
are viewpoint neutral”). 
 67. See Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Perez v. Hoblock, 368 
F.3d 166, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 68. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 69. Id. at 45 (“In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all 
communicative activity.”). 
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discussion.70 The only way the government may in some sense “close” a 
traditional public forum is if the forum loses the characteristics that 
make it a “place[] which by long tradition or by government fiat [has] 
been devoted to assembly and debate,”71 such as when the government 
sells the land to a private buyer or changes the physical character of the 
land.72 The government may, however, completely shut down 
designated and limited public forums.73 This power derives from the 
principle that the government is a property owner like any other and 
may control its property in a lawful manner.74 
Decisions after Perry struggled to define the precise limitations of 
the government’s ability to close traditional public forums from limited 
types of expressive activity. In Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
Board v. Pinette,75 the Supreme Court considered a challenge by the 
Klu Klux Klan, which had been denied permission to erect a Latin cross 
in a statehouse plaza.76 Ohio law had declared the plaza “available ‘for 
use by the public . . . for free discussion of public questions, or for 
activities of a broad public purpose,’” and citizens had used the area in 
such a manner for over a century.77 Authority to regulate public access 
to the plaza lay with the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board, 
and the process of gaining access entailed filling out a simple 
application and meeting several content-neutral criteria.78 The board had 
maintained a policy of granting such applications to groups wishing to 
leave unattended displays in the square, but when the Klan applied for 
permission to leave an unattended Latin cross in the square, the board 
denied its application on Establishment Clause grounds.79 
The Klan brought suit to challenge its exclusion from the plaza, and 
the district court held that the unattended cross would not violate the 
Establishment Clause.80 The court ordered the board to grant the Klan 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Id. Some have described the public’s right to use traditional public forums as a 
prescriptive easement. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1163 (2005) (calling the Court’s rationale for affording 
protection to speech in traditional public forums the “prescriptive easement justification”). 
 71. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 72. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In some sense the government always retains authority to close a 
public forum, by selling the property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal 
use. Otherwise the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or eliminating a street or 
sidewalk, which no one has understood the public forum doctrine to require.”). 
 73. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (establishing that “a State is not required to indefinitely retain 
the open character of the [designated public forum]”). 
 74. Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 
129–30 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 76. Id. at 758. 
 77. Id. at 757 (quoting OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 128-4-02(A) (1994)). 
 78. Id. at 757–58. 
 79. Id. at 758. 
 80. Id. at 758–59. 
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access, which it did.81 The board appealed, the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the ruling of the district court, and the board sought and obtained 
certiorari.82 Identifying the square as a traditional public forum,83 the 
Supreme Court held that the Klan’s private, unattended cross did not 
violate the Establishment Clause when placed in the square.84 
Eight out of nine Justices in Pinette expressed the opinion that the 
board, although required to permit the Klan’s unattended cross pursuant 
to its existing policy, retained the authority to close the traditional 
public forum altogether with respect to unattended displays.85 Thus, 
although the government may not close a traditional public forum 
entirely, it may foreclose certain types of expressive activity that it has 
historically permitted in the forum.86 
The government’s authority to close a designated or limited public 
forum is much more far-reaching and encompasses the ability to shut 
off a forum entirely from expressive activity. Recall that in Perry, the 
Supreme Court noted that “a State is not required to indefinitely retain 
the open character of [a designated public forum].”87 Perry did not, 
however, articulate the scope of this forum closure power. The Ninth 
Circuit has interpreted this language in Perry as standing for the 
proposition that the government may close designated or limited public 
forums “whenever it wants.”88 The Third Circuit, in dicta, has construed 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Id. at 759. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 757. 
 84. Id. at 770 (plurality opinion). 
 85. See id. at 761; Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 
1298 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that in Pinette, “[e]ight members of the Court joined behind the 
proposition that the State of Ohio ‘could ban all unattended private displays in [the forum] if it 
so desired’” (quoting Pinette, 515 U.S. at 783 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment))); see also SMOLLA, supra note 27, at § 8:51. 
 86. See Grossbaum, 100 F.3d at 1298.  The eight Justices’ dicta in Pinette should not be 
interpreted too broadly and should be read in conjunction with the Court’s consistently firm 
opposition to viewpoint discrimination in public forums. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an 
egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech 
when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the 
rationale for the restriction.”). Pinette does not stand for the proposition that the government 
may foreclose activity in a traditional public forum in retaliation against a speaker’s viewpoint, 
but it does allow foreclosing limited types of activity for legitimate purposes. 
 87. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
 88. Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Santa Monica Food Not 
Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Currier’s 
expansive interpretation of Perry’s forum closure power with approval as support for the 
proposition that total forum closure mooted plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim). The Ninth 
Circuit, before Currier and Santa Monica, once described the government’s forum closure 
power much more narrowly. See United States v. Griefen, 200 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that “[i]f a closure of a public forum is for a valid rather than a disguised impermissible 
purpose, the potential for self-imposed or government censorship . . . does not exist” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. at 1265 (“Our holding [that temporary closure of a portion of a national 
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Perry to mean that “officials may choose to close . . . a designated 
public forum at any time.”89 The Eighth Circuit has likewise suggested 
a broad forum closure power,90 and the Seventh Circuit, after 
considering the issue directly, expressly refused to limit the 
government’s forum closure power by refusing to extend a cause of 
action in retaliatory forum closure cases.91 In contrast, the First Circuit 
has recognized that the government’s forum closure power is not 
unlimited and is circumscribed by the First Amendment’s prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination.92 Some federal district courts have 
advanced the First Circuit’s position,93 but given the lack of clear 




                                                                                                                     
forest to allow road construction did not violate the First Amendment] does not imply that an 
order that closes a public forum is sacrosanct. Should it appear that the true purpose of such an 
order was to silence disfavored speech or speakers . . . the federal courts are capable of taking 
prompt and measurably appropriate action.”). Given Santa Monica’s refusal to recognize a First 
Amendment claim after forum closure and citation of Currier’s expansive dicta as support for 
its refusal, it appears that the Ninth Circuit no longer recognizes a cause of action for retaliatory 
forum closure. 
 89. United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 
46). 
 90. See Straights & Gays for Equal. v. Osseo Area Sch.–Dist. No. 279, 471 F.3d 908, 913 
(8th Cir. 2006) (noting that a school that likely denied equal access to an ideological student 
group in violation of the Equal Access Act was still “free to wipe out all of its noncurriculum 
related student groups and totally close its forum” (quoting Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 
12 F.3d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 91. See Grossbaum, 100 F.3d at 1292–96 (finding retaliatory motive and discriminatory 
intent irrelevant and refusing to extend First Amendment retaliation doctrine where a local 
building authority entirely shut down a nonpublic forum in response to controversy over 
religious holiday displays). 
 92. See Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (“Once the state has created a forum, it may not condition access to the forum on the 
content of the message to be communicated, or close the forum solely because it disagrees with 
the messages being communicated in it.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 116 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73 
(D.D.C. 2000) (“The government may close a public forum that it has created by 
designation . . . so long as the reasons for closure are not content-based.”). 
 94. Compare, e.g., ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1292 (M.D. Pa. 1991) 
(recognizing a cause of action for forum closure), Mo. Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Kansas 
City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that a complaint alleging that the city 
shut down a local public access channel to prevent the Klu Klux Klan from gaining access to it 
stated a § 1983 claim, and noting that “[a] state may only eliminate a designated public forum if 
it does so in a manner consistent with the First Amendment”), and Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. 
Supp. 1195, 1201–03 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (declaring unconstitutional a city’s closure of a public 
sidewalk outside an abortion clinic in retaliation against abortion protestors’ viewpoint), with 
Demmon v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 342 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (E.D. Va. 2004) (stating that 
forum closure cannot provide a cause of action). 
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III.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S IMPLICITLY BROAD INTERPRETATION OF 
THE GOVERNMENT’S FORUM CLOSURE POWER 
The Eleventh Circuit has yet to reach directly the issue of what 
limits, if any, constrain the government’s forum closure power, a power 
recognized but left undefined in Perry. In line with the Third, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, however, the court in Chabad-Lubavitch of 
Georgia v. Miller95 suggested in an en banc opinion that it might 
endorse a broad construction of this power. In later decisions, the 
Eleventh Circuit should clarify and limit Miller’s broad language by 
recognizing that the government’s forum closure power is constrained 
by, if nothing else, the principle that the government may not close a 
forum in retaliation against a speaker’s viewpoint. Such a rule would 
place the Eleventh Circuit in line with the First Circuit on the retaliatory 
forum closure issue.96 
In Miller, Chabad-Lubavitch, a nonprofit Jewish organization,97 
received permission in 1989 to erect a large menorah display during 
Chanukah in a plaza outside the Georgia state capitol building.98 The 
privately owned menorah, accompanied by a sign reading, “HAPPY 
CHANUKAH from CHABAD OF GEORGIA,” remained on display in 
front of the state capitol for the duration of the entire eight-day holiday 
during 1989.99 Each day at sundown, Chabad-Lubavitch lit a candle of 
the menorah during a forty-five minute ceremony.100 When the 
organization applied to have its menorah similarly displayed during 
Chanukah in 1990, however, the Georgia Attorney General issued an 
opinion letter concluding that the requested display would violate the 
Establishment Clause.101 The state thus denied Chabad-Lubavitch’s 
request, and Chabad-Lubavitch brought suit, claiming violations of its 
right to free speech.102 This suit ultimately failed, but the organization 
did not lose heart. Chabad-Lubavitch submitted an application the 
following year asking to display the menorah during Chanukah, either 
on the plaza or inside the capitol building rotunda.103 During the 
preceding decade, the state had opened the rotunda for various types of 
expressive activity, both secular and religious, “pursuant to a ‘content-
                                                                                                                     
 95. 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
 96. See discussion supra Part II. 
 97. According to its website, “Chabad-Lubavitch is a philosophy, a movement, and 
organization” stemming from Hasidic Judaism, whose “system of Jewish religious philosophy, 
the deepest dimension of G–d’s Torah, teaches understanding and recognition of the Creator, the 
role and purpose of creation, and the importance and unique mission of each creature.” About 
Chabad-Lubavitch, CHABAD.ORG, http://www.chabad.org/global/about/article_cdo/aid/ 
36226/jewish/About-Chabad-Lubavitch.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2011). 
 98. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1386. 
 103. Id. 
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neutral, equal access policy . . . .’”104 Even private, unattended displays 
had been permitted in the rotunda.105  
When it did not receive a response to its 1991 request, Chabad-
Lubavitch amended the complaint it had filed in 1990, seeking 
injunctive relief with respect to both the plaza and the rotunda.106 The 
district court granted the state’s motions for summary judgment as to 
both claims, a decision which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.107 On en 
banc rehearing, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the 
state’s content-based exclusion of the group’s menorah could not 
withstand strict scrutiny.108 The court reasoned that the state could have 
granted Chabad-Lubavitch’s request to display the menorah in the 
rotunda, pursuant to its neutral open-access policy, without risking an 
Establishment Clause violation.109 Displays erected in the rotunda, a 
limited public forum,110 could only be perceived by a reasonable 
observer as private free speech, not governmental endorsement of 
religion.111 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit granted Chabad-
Lubavitch’s request for injunctive relief.112 In expansive dicta, however, 
the court opined:  
If Georgia fears that it would violate the Establishment 
Clause by allowing the display, it can avoid the perception 
that it is endorsing a religion by (1) closing the forum 
altogether, (2) posting signs to explain the nature of the 
public forum, or (3) enacting time, place, and manner 
restrictions governing the form of presentations in the 
Rotunda.113  
It is difficult to see how Georgia could legitimately fear that it would 
violate the Establishment Clause if the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc 
decision had already definitively resolved the question. Any forum 
closure ordered at that point, after the resolution of the case, would 
more likely have been the result of animus toward Chabad-Lubavitch’s 
religious viewpoint. Although it did not consider the issue directly, this 
language in Miller suggests that the Eleventh Circuit favors a broad 
construction of the government’s power to close a designated or limited 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 1386–87 (quoting Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 976 F.2d 1386 app. at 
1390 (11th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. Id. at 1386. Displays permitted in the past included “an eighteen-foot tall Indian 
Wattle and Daub Hut during the annual Indian Heritage Week, . . . a forty-one poster exhibit 
sponsored by the Atlanta Jewish Foundation, . . . and a thirty-five flag exhibit during 
‘International Week.’” Id. 
 106.  Id. at 1387. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1389. 
 110. Id. at 1391. 
 111. Id. at 1392. 
 112. Id. at 1395–96. 
 113. Id. at 1394 (emphasis added). 
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public forum, even encompassing the ability to shut down a forum in 
retaliation against a speaker’s viewpoint.114  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, 
in rejecting a retaliatory forum closure claim, cited Miller for the 
sweeping proposition that “[c]losing the forum is a constitutionally 
permissible solution to the dilemma caused by concerns about providing 
equal access while avoiding the appearance of government endorsement 
of religion.”115 
As one commentator has observed, “[T]he Supreme Court has never 
specifically addressed the question of when a designated public forum 
can be closed.”116 However, an expansive interpretation of the forum 
closure power recognized in Perry is improvident insofar as it might 
permit the government to close a forum in retaliation against a speaker’s 
viewpoint. If a retaliatory forum closure case comes before the Eleventh 
Circuit, it should qualify the expansive view it suggested in Miller by 
holding that the government’s forum closure power knows at least two 
constitutional constraints: a forum may not be closed in retaliation 
against a speaker’s viewpoint or against a speaker’s initiation of suit to 
challenge his viewpoint-based exclusion or expulsion from a forum. 
Miller’s suggested construction of Perry’s forum closure power, if left 
untempered, will transgress basic constitutional guarantees against 
retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, and the Eleventh Circuit 
should extend First Amendment retaliation doctrine to prohibit such 
abuse. To set the framework for this argument, Part IV provides an 
overview of First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence. 
IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF A FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM 
The First Amendment requires the government to refrain from 
retaliating against speakers because of their protected speech.117 “The 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See SMOLLA, supra note 27, at § 8:51. 
 115. DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 116. Derigan A. Silver, Note, Policy, Practice, and Intent: Forum Analysis and the 
Uncertain Status of the Student Press at Public Colleges and Universities, 12 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 201, 227 (2007). 
 117. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (stating that “as a general matter the 
First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory 
actions . . . for speaking out”); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998) (noting that 
“the First Amendment bars retaliation for protected speech”); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 
620 (10th Cir. 1990) (“An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected 
right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have 
been proper.” (quoting Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also John Koerner, Note, Between Healthy and Hartman: 
Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 758 (2009) (“The First 
Amendment prohibits government officials from retaliating against individuals on the basis of 
their protected speech.”); Colin P. Watson, Note, Limiting a Constitutional Tort Without 
Probable Cause: First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, 107 MICH. L. REV. 111, 
111 (2008) (“Federal law provides a cause of action for individuals who are the target of adverse 
state action taken in retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights.”). 
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First Amendment right to free speech includes not only the affirmative 
right to speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public 
official for the exercise of that right.”118 “The reason why such 
retaliation offends the Constitution is that it threatens to inhibit exercise 
of the protected right.”119 One who suffers governmental retaliatory 
action in response to his exercise of protected speech may bring suit 
under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.120 
A. Elements of a First Amendment Retaliation Claim 
To set out a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff 
must plead that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the First 
Amendment; (2) the government took significant adverse action against 
him (that is, the government inflicted an injury that would chill a person 
of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected 
activity); and (3) the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected conduct was a 
substantial factor—that is, a motivating factor—in the government’s 
decision to take adverse action against the plaintiff.121  
 
1.  Exercise of a Constitutionally Protected Right 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 119. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588 n.10; see also Perez v. Ellington, 421 F.3d 1128, 1131 
(10th Cir. 2005) (“Although retaliation is not expressly discussed in the First Amendment, it 
may be actionable inasmuch as governmental retaliation tends to chill citizens’ exercise of their 
constitutional rights.”). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), in which the Court 
stated:  
 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a 
person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though 
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there 
are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny 
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the 
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally 
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in 
effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 
“produce a result which [it] could not command directly.” Such interference 
with constitutional rights is impermissible. 
 
Id. at 597 (citation omitted) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 120. See supra note 22. 
 121. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); 
see also Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 821 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“Under Mount Healthy and its progeny, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was 
participating in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) defendant’s action injured plaintiff in a 
way ‘likely [to] chill a person of ordinary firmness from’ further participation in that activity; 
and (3) in part, plaintiff’s constitutionally protected activity motivated defendant’s adverse 
action.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998))). The 
Sixth Circuit’s test for the second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim outlined in 
Center for Bio-Ethical Reform represents the generally accepted standard. See infra note 128. 
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Courts have found that the First Amendment’s implicit protection 
against governmental retaliation applies in a wide variety of contexts. 
For example, courts have held an individual’s or group’s First 
Amendment right of association to be protected from retaliation by 
government actors, whether exercised in the form of contracting for 
business122 or deciding to hire an attorney.123 The Supreme Court has 
held that a public school teacher’s private speech regarding the school 
system for which he works, if confined to matters of “public concern,” 
is protected from retaliation by his employer.124 Likewise protected 
from governmental retaliation are insults directed at law enforcement 
officers, provided they do not rise to the level of “fighting words.”125 
The First Amendment’s prohibition against retaliation also protects 
expressive activity such as driving a billboard truck that displays pro-
life messages and graphic abortion-related images.126 In addition, the 
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from retaliating against citizens because of their free 
exercise of religion.127 
2.  Significant Adverse Governmental Action 
The second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim requires 
a plaintiff to prove that the government took significant adverse action 
against him. To establish this element, a plaintiff must show that the 
government inflicted an injury that would chill a person of ordinary 
firmness from further participation in the protected activity.128  
                                                                                                                     
 122. See, e.g., Perez, 421 F.3d at 1132 (protecting from retaliation a Native American 
tribe’s decision to contract with a gasoline company). 
 123. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (protecting from 
retaliation a murder suspect’s decision to hire a private attorney). 
 124. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 574–
75 (1968) (protecting from retaliation a teacher’s letter to a local newspaper that was critical of 
the way the board of education and superintendent had handled proposals to raise revenue). 
 125. See, e.g., Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895–97 (6th Cir. 2002) (calling a police 
officer an “asshole” and “stupid” protected from retaliation); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 461 (1987) (noting that “the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal 
criticism and challenge directed at police officers”). 
 126. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 821–
22 (6th Cir. 2007) (affording protection from retaliation to the driver of a vehicle that displayed 
graphic abortion-related images). 
 127. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (protecting from retaliation a 
Seventh-Day Adventist’s refusal to work on Saturday for religious reasons). 
 128. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 477 F.3d at 821. The Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits share the Sixth Circuit’s formulation of this element. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. 
Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e conclude that the proper inquiry 
asks ‘whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future 
First Amendment activities.’” (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 
1996))); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1177 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The focus, of course, is upon 
whether a person of ordinary firmness would be chilled, rather than whether the particular 
plaintiff is chilled.”); Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005) (surveying the 
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Many government actions will satisfy this second element. For 
example, the Supreme Court has held that a public university’s refusal 
to renew an untenured professor’s employment contract in retaliation 
against his protected speech would give rise to a First Amendment 
retaliation claim.129 In a similar vein, a public school’s dismissal of a 
teacher satisfies the significant adverse action requirement.130 
Furthermore, courts have held that the issuance of a jeopardy tax 
assessment,131 the denial of public benefits,132 and the denial of 
promotions and transfers to public employees133 meet this element. To 
further illustrate the breadth of the adverse action element, 
commentators have argued, and at least one circuit has found, that 
arrests134 and detentions accompanied by a search without probable 
cause135 would “chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from 
future First Amendment activities.”136 
3.  Causation: The Substantial Factor Formulation 
The third and final element a plaintiff must plead to state a § 1983 
claim for First Amendment retaliation is causation. The causation 
element requires plaintiffs to show that their exercise of a 
constitutionally protected right was a “substantial factor”––that is, a 
                                                                                                                     
case law among the federal circuits and adopting the “objective test”); Crawford-El, 93 F.3d 
813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The district court commendably latched onto our approval of Bart 
and applied a sensible standard—whether an official’s acts ‘would chill or silence a “person of 
ordinary firmness” from future First Amendment activities.’” (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 
844 F. Supp. 795, 801 (D.D.C. 1994))).  
The Fourth Circuit, however, has formulated a different, subjective test for this second 
element. See Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Second, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged retaliatory action adversely affected the 
plaintiff’s constitutionally protected speech.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). 
 130. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 574 
(1968). 
 131. See, e.g., Perez v. Ellington, 421 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 132. See, e.g., Suarez Corp. Indus., 202 F.3d at 686–87 (“For example, a public official 
who restricts the award of or terminates public benefits based on the citizen’s exercise of his 
First Amendment rights adversely affects that citizen’s First Amendment rights.”). 
133. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (“Today we are 
asked to decide the constitutionality of several related political patronage practices—whether 
promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees may be 
constitutionally based on party affiliation and support. We hold that they may not.”). 
 134. See Koerner, supra note 117, at 761 (“An arrest is certainly an injury that would chill 
a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected speech.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 822 
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[a] two and one-half hour detention absent probable cause, 
accompanied by a search . . . would undoubtedly deter an average law-abiding citizen” from 
future free speech activities). 
 136. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (adopting the D.C. Circuit’s 
objective formulation of the adverse action requirement). 
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“motivating factor”137—in the government’s decision to take the 
adverse action of which the plaintiff complained. As several circuits 
have stressed, a plaintiff need not show that his exercise of 
constitutionally protected conduct was the motivating factor in the 
government’s decision to take retaliatory action; he must only show that 
it was a motivating factor.138 
B.  The Government’s Affirmative Defense 
Once the plaintiff has established his claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the burden shifts to the government to prove, also by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it would have taken the adverse 
action even in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected speech. In Mount 
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,139 the 
Supreme Court first articulated this affirmative defense.140 The Mount 
Healthy Court considered a lawsuit brought by an untenured teacher 
who claimed that the board of education refused to renew his 
employment contract in retaliation against his protected speech.141 
Before the occurrence giving rise to his claim, the plaintiff had engaged 
in several altercations with his fellow teachers. In one such incident, he 
had an argument with another teacher that ended when that teacher 
slapped him.142 In yet another incident, the plaintiff had caused an 
altercation with school cafeteria staff when he disapproved of the 
amount of spaghetti they had served him.143 The plaintiff also had failed 
to maintain a professional attitude toward his students, using foul and 
offensive language when referring to students involved in a disciplinary 
complaint and making an obscene gesture to two female students when 
they failed to obey him.144 The last straw, however, occurred when the 
plaintiff made a phone call to a local radio station in criticism of the 
board’s adoption of a teacher dress code policy.145 When the plaintiff’s 
employment contract expired that year, the board refused to renew it, 
referencing “the radio station incident and . . . the obscene-gesture 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Canton, 319 F. App’x 411, 419 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing 
that “a plaintiff satisfies [the causation element of a First Amendment retaliation claim] by 
showing that the adverse action ‘was motivated at least in part’ by the protected speech” 
(quoting Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2006))); 
Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008) (requiring plaintiff to show that his 
exercise of a constitutionally protected right was merely a motivating factor, not the motivating 
factor, in defendant’s decision to retaliate). 
 139. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 140. See Koerner, supra note 117, at 764 (noting that the Court established its burden-
shifting framework in Mount Healthy). 
 141. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282. 
 142. Id. at 281. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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incident.”146 
The Court began its brief analysis with the observation that: 
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether 
protected conduct played a part, “substantial” or otherwise, 
in a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a 
better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally 
protected conduct than he would have occupied had he 
done nothing.147 
Finding that the plaintiff’s call to the radio station was a constitutionally 
protected activity,148 and noting the district court’s finding that the 
decision not to rehire him satisfied the significant adverse action and 
causation requirements for First Amendment retaliation claims,149 the 
Court nonetheless held that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim 
against the board of education if the board could show “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same 
decision as to [the plaintiff’s] reemployment even in the absence of the 
protected conduct.”150 The Court then remanded the case for a 
determination as to whether the board would have decided not to rehire 
the plaintiff even in the absence of his phone call to the radio station.151 
Thus, Mount Healthy made clear that government actors may assert, 
as an affirmative defense to a prima facie First Amendment retaliation 
claim, that they would have taken the adverse action complained of 
even in the absence of the plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment 
rights.152 
V.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A § 1983 CAUSE OF 
ACTION IN RETALIATORY FORUM CLOSURE CASES 
The argument that the government’s forum closure power is not 
unlimited and that the Eleventh Circuit should recognize a § 1983 cause 
of action for the victims of retaliatory forum closure is a relatively 
straightforward one. First, the victims of retaliatory forum closure can 
set forth a claim that includes all the elements of a traditional First 
Amendment retaliation claim. Second, retaliatory forum closure 
contravenes foundational constitutional guarantees. Third, granting a 
cause of action and remedy in retaliatory forum closure cases would 
vindicate a right Congress sought to protect in enacting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, and limiting the government’s forum closure power would 
comport with the statute’s broad scope. Finally, in typical retaliatory 
forum closure cases, an injunctive remedy of limited duration can be 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 281–83. 
 147. Id. at 285. 
 148. Id. at 284. 
 149. Id. at 283, 287. 
 150. Id. at 287. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Koerner, supra note 117, at 764. 
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easily granted and will cure the injury without unduly interfering with 
the government’s legitimate exercise of control over its property. 
A.  Retaliatory Forum Closure Cases Satisfy All the Elements of a First 
Amendment Retaliation Claim 
Recall that to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a 
plaintiff must plead (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the First 
Amendment; (2) the government took significant adverse action against 
him; and (3) the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected conduct was a 
substantial factor in the government’s decision to take adverse action 
against the plaintiff.153 Instances of retaliatory forum closure meet all 
these criteria. 
Plaintiffs can easily establish the first required element. In the 
typical retaliatory forum closure case, a government actor chooses to 
completely shut down a designated or limited public forum as a 
response to both a speaker’s viewpoint and retention of counsel (or 
pursuit of legal remedy) to enforce his constitutional right to speak in 
the forum.154 A speaker’s retention of counsel is protected under the 
Freedom of Association Clause of the First Amendment.155 More 
significantly, if the speech or expressive activity a speaker wishes to 
conduct in a forum is protected under the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment, a speaker will automatically establish this first 
element. In a limited public forum, of course, the speaker first will have 
to show that he enjoys a so-called “right of access” to the forum.156 
Finally, a speaker’s access to the courts is also secured by the First 
Amendment.157 Thus, in typical retaliatory forum closure cases, 
plaintiffs can successfully plead the first element of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, establishing that they engaged in an activity protected 
by the First Amendment. 
As to the second element of a retaliation claim, forum closure 
certainly constitutes “significant adverse action” that would chill a 
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the 
constitutionally protected activity.158 By definition, forum closure chills 
even a person of extraordinary firmness from continuing to speak or 
conduct expressive activity in the forum, as it renders any speech or 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See supra Section IV.A. 
 154. In the Burrows’ controversy, discussed in the Introduction, it appears that the 
plaintiffs’ initial exclusion from the forum was motivated by viewpoint discrimination, while 
the decision to close the forum entirely was made in retaliation against both the plaintiffs’ 
religious viewpoint and the plaintiffs’ assertion of their rights through counsel. 
 155. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The right to retain and 
consult with an attorney, however, implicates not only the Sixth Amendment but also clearly 
established First Amendment rights of association and free speech.”). 
 156. See Rohr, supra note 29, at 307–09 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
 158. Recall that this objective test is the generally accepted formulation of the adverse 
action requirement. See supra note 128. 
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expressive activity in the forum impossible. 
Retaliatory forum closure cases also satisfy the third element of a 
First Amendment retaliation claim. As in the Burrows’ forum closure 
incident, it is a speaker’s expression of his viewpoint or retention of 
counsel to enforce his right to express his viewpoint that draws fire 
from the operator of the forum. It does not matter that other 
considerations might also influence the forum closure decision; for a 
First Amendment retaliation claim to arise, a speaker’s exercise of 
constitutionally protected conduct need only be a motivating factor, not 
the sole motivating factor, in the government’s decision to take adverse 
action.159 
B.  Retaliatory Forum Closure Transgresses Basic First Amendment 
Guarantees  
Aside from the particular elements of a retaliation claim, on a more 
basic level, retaliatory forum closure simply does not accord with the 
foundational guarantees of the First Amendment. Two of the First 
Amendment’s most basic guarantees are the rights to be free from 
government-initiated viewpoint discrimination and retaliation for 
“speaking out.”160 These protections would be of little value to speakers 
if the government, although required to afford the protections while a 
forum is held open, always retained a trump card to disregard them by 
shutting down the forum entirely. If government has the power to shut 
down a designated or limited public forum at any time in retaliation 
against a speaker’s viewpoint, then the First Amendment’s 
“marketplace of ideas,”161 though protected from selective suppression, 
would remain vulnerable to total censorship in the event that the 
operator’s animus toward a viewpoint expressed in the forum 
outweighed the operator’s desire to hold the forum open to competing 
viewpoints. 
The Seventh Circuit has observed that total forum closure is a 
facially content-neutral regulation on speech,162 but the drastic, all-
                                                                                                                     
 159. See discussion supra Subsection IV.A.3. 
 160. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (stating that “the law is settled that 
as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an 
individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of 
content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
restriction.”). 
 161. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas[;] . . . the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . . That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”); see also Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: 
Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 971 (2010) (noting that 
Holmes’ “marketplace of ideas” has been seen to rank among “the most forceful metaphors in 
American jurisprudence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 162. See Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1291 (7th 
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encompassing nature of total forum closure emphasizes rather than 
diminishes the point. If a speaker’s viewpoint offends the government 
so much that it would prefer to close down a forum entirely rather than 
operate it according to the viewpoint-neutral manner the First 
Amendment commands, the specter of retaliation and viewpoint 
discrimination looms ominously. And in the event that specter is merely 
phantasmal, recognizing a § 1983 cause of action for the victims of 
retaliatory forum closure would not sound the death knell for an 
innocuous forum closure. If the government can demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it would have shut down the forum 
even in the absence of a speaker’s expression of his viewpoint (or 
retention of legal counsel or pursuit of legal remedy to enforce his right 
to express his viewpoint), the speaker will not be entitled to relief.163  
Furthermore, even if the government cannot invoke Mount Healthy’s 
affirmative defense, the plaintiff will still have to prove each element of 
his claim on the merits. 
C.  Granting a Cause of Action for Retaliatory Forum Closure Is 
Consistent with the Purpose of § 1983 
Extending First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence to provide a 
§ 1983 cause of action for the victims of retaliatory forum closure 
would at the same time serve the purposes of § 1983 itself. As the 
Supreme Court has stressed: 
A broad construction of § 1983 is compelled by the 
statutory language, which speaks of deprivations of “any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws.” Accordingly, we have “repeatedly 
held that the coverage of [§ 1983] must be broadly 
construed.” The legislative history of the section also 
stresses that as a remedial statute, it should be “‘liberally 
and beneficently construed.’”164 
The Court has consistently rejected attempts to limit the types of 
constitutional rights whose violation will give rise to a § 1983 private 
right of action.165 The circuits have hammered this point home even 
further, observing that § 1983 was “designed to provide a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                     
Cir. 1996) (calling total forum closure “content-neutral”). 
 163. See Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (affording 
an affirmative defense to First Amendment retaliation claims when defendants can show they 
would have reached the same decision even in the absence of protected conduct). 
 164. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (alteration in original) (citations and 
footnote omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 
493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989), and Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
684 (1978), respectively). 
 165. Id. at 445 (stating that “we have rejected attempts to limit the types of constitutional 
rights that are encompassed within the phrase ‘rights, privileges, or immunities’”). 
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remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights,”166 and that “[t]he 
contours of § 1983 must necessarily remain flexible to accommodate 
changing circumstances and the exigencies of a given 
era. . . . [Section] 1983 is appropriately suited to redress any ‘new 
method of interference’ with the rights which its words protect.”167 
Given § 1983’s intentionally broad scope, it is likely that Congress did 
indeed seek to create a private right of action for individuals to whom 
retaliatory forum closure has denied the very core of the First 
Amendment’s protections.168 
D.  Damages Sustained by Retaliatory Forum Closure Can Be Cured by 
Injunctive Relief of a Limited Duration  
Plaintiffs who bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may seek a variety 
of remedies. Claims brought under § 1983 sound in tort, and just as tort 
law provides remedies for invasions of personal or property interests, 
the statute “provides relief for invasions of rights protected under 
federal law.”169 Given the compensatory nature of the statute, plaintiffs 
whose constitutional rights have been violated may bring an action for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.170 
In the majority of retaliatory forum closure cases, an injunction 
ordering the government to hold the forum open (or to re-open the 
forum if already closed) for a limited duration will suffice to cure the 
injury, while at the same time honoring the government’s right to 
control its property.171 The Eleventh Circuit, and other courts willing to 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Smith v. Hampton Training Sch. for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1966) 
(emphasis added); see also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 1965) (declaring that “[t]he 
Civil Rights Act is not to be interpreted narrowly”). 
 167. Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 324 (1941)). 
 168. Section 1983 was directed in large part at preventing government actors from 
exercising their discretionary powers to infringe constitutional liberties. See City of Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) (observing that “the deterrence of future abuses of 
power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983”). 
169.  City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999). 
Section 1983 is to be interpreted “in light of the ‘background of tort liability.’” Id. (quoting 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). 
 170. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (stating 
that “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, 
or injunctive relief”). 
 171. Recall that the Supreme Court in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, alluding to general property law concepts, noted that “[t]he State, no less than a private 
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated,” and that “a [s]tate is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of 
[a designated public forum].” 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129–30 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As 
a property owner, surely the government may control the disposition of its property. Unlike 
private property owners, however, the government may not wield its ownership powers in a 
manner that will infringe a basic constitutional right. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 268 
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recognize a cause of action for retaliatory forum closure, should craft a 
set of factors for determining the appropriate duration of such an 
injunction. The injunction should last only as long as necessary for the 
plaintiff to speak or conduct expressive activity in the manner he would 
have done absent the forum closure and should end automatically 
whenever the government would have elected to close down the forum 
had the plaintiff not chosen to exercise his First Amendment rights. This 
fact-sensitive inquiry will naturally involve some measure of estimation, 
but if done carefully, it will cure the chilling effect of forum closure on 
speech without forcing the government to hold open a forum it would 
have eventually closed. Additionally, this approach logically follows 
from the affirmative defense afforded by Mount Healthy.172 
In the event that an injunction of the type just described would place 
an unreasonable burden upon the government or would prove 
impractical, a court could always award damages in a manner similar to 
that of other § 1983 claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the broad interpretation of the government’s forum closure 
power suggested in Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, the Eleventh Circuit 
stands at a crossroads. It may either limit Miller’s expansive view as 
dicta or affirm it as a controlling rule of law. Should the Eleventh 
Circuit choose to do the former and recognize that the First Amendment 
does not allow closure in retaliation against a speaker’s viewpoint, it 
will stand with the First Circuit in providing full constitutional 
protections to the victims of retaliatory forum closure. Should the 
Eleventh Circuit instead choose to affirm Miller’s expansive view as a 
positive rule of law, it will join the Seventh Circuit, and perhaps the 
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, in denying two of the First 
Amendment’s most core protections to a wide range of citizens. 
Considering the split that unquestionably exists between the Seventh 
and First Circuits, this issue might not reach full resolution at the circuit 
level. However, if the Eleventh Circuit were to spark a trend toward 
qualifying expansive dicta on the forum closure power issue, perhaps 
the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits would follow, producing a strong 
majority rule that would reduce the likelihood of decision at the 
Supreme Court. Without such a qualification, those courts will remain 
vulnerable to reversal by the Supreme Court when it finally has 
occasion to decide the scope of the government’s forum closure power. 
Which direction the Eleventh Circuit will take remains unclear. But 
as for Donald and Meagan Burrows, whose open forum was shut down 
in retaliation against their viewpoint, the violation of their First 
Amendment rights is an open and shut case. 
                                                                                                                     
(observing that “the deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state 
law is an important purpose of § 1983”). 
 172. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
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